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erred when he reduced a disciplinary suspension of one week to
a written disciplinary warning, because the language of the contract vested in the employer the power to determine the penalty.
While the court said: "The sole question in this case is whether
the arbitrator exceeded his authority in making his award," the
court examined the language of the contract and found that the
arbitrator had been wrong in his interpretation.
In Safeway Stores v. American Bakery and Confectionary Workers International Union, Local 111, 390 F. 2d 79, 67 LRRM 2646
(5th Cir., 1968), the court, enunciating the traditional view, said:
"The arbiter was chosen to be the Judge. That Judge has spoken.
There it ends." However, the court continued that the arbitrator
had "put forward a passably plausible ... analysis of the ... contractual ... provisions," but the court assumed, "without here
deciding, that if the reasoning is so palpably faulty that no judge,
or group of judges, could ever conceivably have made such a ruling
then the Court can strike down the award."

One nonarbitrator lawyer who read both the Mittenthal and
Howlett papers said: "My thought is that both of you are doing
the same thing, but you are afraid to admit it." He may be right.
Perhaps the Esquire cartoon of several years ago is appropriate:
One scientist writes equations on the blackboard; another scientist, with pistol pointed at him, says: "Jones, you've disproved
my theory for the last time."
I trust, however, that arbitrators will not emulate Lady Macbeth's doctor who, when he viewed her nocturnal wanderings,
concluded, "I think, but dare not speak." 81

Discussion-THEODORE

J.

ST. ANTOINE.

Back in the days before the Green Bay Packers acquired fee
simple title to the National Football League championship, I saw
a playoff game here at the Cleveland Stadium between the Browns
81

Macbeth, Act V, Scene I.
• Associate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
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and the Detroit Lions. My Michigan loyalties have created a
mental block as to the final score, but I do have a vivid recollection of one stirring goal-line stand by Detroit. A great, burly Lion
tackle stationed himself about a foot from the goal post-and I
remember thinking that whatever play the Brown quarterback
might call, it certainly wasn't going to be a run over tackle. In
facing two such formidable advocates as Dick Mittenthal and Bob
Howlett, I feel very much like that Brown quarterback of yesteryear. (I shall refrain, however, from carrying out the analogy so far
as to indicate which of these gentlemen reminds me of the tackle,
and which of the goal post.) In short, I'd like to avoid as long as
possible a direct confrontation with either of them. Therefore,
perhaps I should start off by trying an end run.
To begin with, I think we can substantially reduce the area of
potential conflict among us. First, I take it we'd all concede that
the union and the employer may agree, either through the contract or the submission agreement, that the arbitrator is to rule on
statutory as well as contractual issues, or that he is to interpret
the contract in the light of relevant statutes as construed by the
courts or administrative agencies. What binding effect such agreements by the parties might have on the various public tribunals
is beyond the scope of our subject here.1 But, as far as the parties
themselves were concerned, there would be no doubt about the
propriety of the arbitrator's considering the effect of statutes.
Second, and probably more important, I assume most of us
would not be troubled by an arbitrator's seeking guidance from
statutes or decisional sources when dealing with a genuinely
ambiguous contractual provision or one which obviously seems
intended to reflect statutory standards. For example, if either of
two interpretations of a particular clause is entirely reasonable
and one is clearly valid under an applicable statute and the other
clearly invalid, the arbitrator would have to be senseless not to
choose the lawful construction. Similarly, when such protean
phrases as "just cause" are at issue, I can see every reason, in the
appropriate case, to look for assistance even as far afield as the
1

The National Labor Relations Board would clearly not be bound regarding matters
within its unfair labor practice jurisdiction. See §lO(a) of the NLRA. See generally
Aaron, "Judicial Intervention in Labor Arbitration," 20 Stan. L. Rev. 41, 44-55
(1967); Smith 8e Jones, "The Supreme Court and Labor Arbitration: The Emerging
Federal Law," 63 Mich. L. Rev. 751, 801-07 (1965).
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criminal law. Finally, there are times, as in the case of union
security clauses, when contractual language closely tracks the
statutory wording, thus deliberately inviting resort to agency
rulings for readings of the contract.
When all the cases are tallied in which the arbitrator may,
consistent with the contract, take cognizance of statutes or other
legal authorities, I suspect we have accounted for the vast bulk
of arbitrations in which noncontractual standards may be applicable to the dispute. Now, I don't want to ruin all the fun this
issue has provided at the last two meetings of this distinguished
body by suggesting that we have nothing here but a tempest in
a teapot. But I do think we have to place the problem in perspective. And much as lawyers-and nonlawyers, too--enjoy a
juicy jurisdictional wrangle, I must play spoilsport by insisting
that the practical importance of our subject can easily be exaggerated and, in all likelihood, has been.
Nonetheless, whatever its exact size, there remains a class of
cases in which the arbitrator must ruefully conclude that his
reading of the contract inexorably leads him in one direction and
his understanding of "the law" in quite another. What is he then
to do? At least three different approaches have been taken by
Bob Howlett, Dick Mittenthal, and Bernard Meltzer. Howlett
would have the arbitrator follow the law. Meltzer would have
him follow the contract. Mittenthal would take a "middle position." The arbitrator, he says, "may permit conduct forbidden by
law but sanctioned by contract," but "should not require conduct
forbidden by law even though sanctioned by contract." There is
considerable practical appeal to the Howlett and Mittenthal views.
But I must align myself, in the main, with Meltzer.
I start with the proposition that arbitrators do not, strictly
speaking, enforce contracts; courts enforce contracts. The arbitrator is simply the "official reader" designated by the parties to
provide definitive interpretations of their agreement. It is his job
to tell the parties what they meant by the various provisions--or,
more realistically, what they would have meant if they had ever
dealt specifically with the problem that has now arisen. An arbitrator is the creature of the contract. It is the source and limit of
his authority, and he has no license to look beyond its borders for
some external standard by which to nullify or restrict its opera-
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tion. The Supreme Court seems in accord with this approach. In
Enterprise Wheel 2 it flatly declared that an arbitral award is
legitimate only if it "draws its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement, and that an arbitrator exceeds the scope of the
submission if he bases his decision on his view of the "requirements of enacted legislation."
For the reasons that Dick Mittenthal has fully spelled out, I
cannot accept Bob Howlett's thesis that "every agreement incorporates all applicable law." It seems to me, however, that Mittenthal denies the logic of his own position when he draws a distinction between an award permitting conduct contrary to law (which
he would approve) and an award requiring conduct contrary to
law (which he would oppose). I think Howlett is right in concluding that both cases must be decided the same way. In each
instance the arbitrator must decide whether to give priority to the
contract or to the law; and if he has no warrant to lean toward
the law in one situation, I don't see where he suddenly acquires it
in the other. Under Howlett's "incorporation" theory, of course,
the arbitrator always decides in accordance with "the law." Since
I reject the incorporation theory, at least as a universal rule, I
would have the arbitrator follow the contract, whatever the
"legal" consequences.
Mittenthal notes at least two supports for his distinction. One
is the "saving" or "separability" clause often found in labor
agreements. Now, insofar as an arbitrator could construe a particular saving clause as authorizing him to apply legal as well as
contractual norms in resolving a given dispute, I'd have no quarrel
with the result. But this, it seems to me, is taking us back to the
category of cases, previously discussed, where the parties have
empowered the arbitrator to utilize statutory standards. It simply
would not present the problem of conflict between contract and
law with which we are wrestling here.
This brings me to a couple of practical suggestions I'd like to
pass along for your consideration. During the last two meetings
the Academy has consumed a good deal of energy examining what
clauses in a labor contract might possibly authorize an arbitrator
2 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 36!1 U.S. 593 597 46 LRRM
2423 (1960).
'
'
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to give weight to statute or decisional law. Surely it's time for
those who have anything to do with the counseling of clients in
collective bargaining to propose a clause which would explicitly
define the arbitrator's powers in this regard. Second, if an arbitrator is faced with a contract which says nothing expressly on
the point, why shouldn't he come out quite forthrightly and ask
the parties whether he has the authority to apply the law as well
as the contract? Naturally, the parties' responses might vary depending on how they thought they would fare in a given case.
But, on the other hand, they might just have enough foresight
to realize that, however they might be hurt or helped in the
particular dispute before the arbitrator, they ought to take a position that would make the most sense in the generality of cases.
At the very least, the arbitrator would have the benefit of the
parties' views on the question.
A second argument for Mittenthal's position that an arbitrator
should not order action contrary to law is based on the common
provision that arbitrators' awards shall be "final and binding."
How can an award be "final and binding," Mittenthal asks, if a
court would set it aside? This argument appears to be subject to
the same criticism I have addressed to the saving-clause argument
-it eliminates the conflict between contract and law, and so the
problem disappears instead of being solved. Moreover, I think
the phrase "final and binding" is too fragile to bear the burden
Mittenthal places on it. I'd say the language means no more than
that the arbitrator's reading of the contract is to be conclusive on
the parties as to their "intent." Obviously, the arbitrator's award
is never final in the sense that it is beyond all power of review by
the courts or administrative agencies.
I don't wish to seem perverse in urging arbitrators to issue
awards that may fly in the face of applicable law. But I just can't
see any source of arbitral power to exercise a more extended jurisdiction unless the parties themselves have so provided. And apart
from this objection as a matter of legal theory, I think there are
highly pragmatic reasons why the arbitrator should limit his inquiry to the labor contract and not essay the formidable task of
statutory construction. Frequently there is bitter dispute between
the parties not only about the legality of a particular interpretation of a contract clause, but also about the intended meaning of
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the clause. One party may be prepared to fight the legal question
through the courts. But first it wants from the arbitrator a
definite ruling on just what the clause in dispute means. I feel
that a party to a labor agreement is entitled to this kind of ruling,
totally divorced from any conclusion by the arbitrator about the
clause's legality. In bargaining for arbitration, it is most likely
that the parties bargained for the arbitrator's opinion on the
contract and not for his opinion on the law.
As has already been noted, many of our best arbitrators are not
lawyers. They are not sought out for their expertise in labor law
but for their expertise in industrial relations. There is no reason
to think, especially in the close, hard cases, that they will bring
any superior insight to the interpretation of statutory and decisional materials. When the law is in a state of flux (a not
unusual posture for labor law), the nonlawyer arbitrator will
probably be a step or two behind the times. But even if he is
the most accomplished of legal scholars, our experience in waiting
out Board decisions on novel questions suggests that his tangling
with subtle legal issues would add markedly to the length and
the expense of the proceedings. And in the difficult, important
cases, court review is likely anyway.
What, after all, is this "law" we would have the arbitrator
apply? ls it a three-to-two decision of the NLRB? Is it a highly
controversial decision of the Board issued just prior to a change
in administrations? Is it a decision of the Board supported, or
opposed, by the courts of appeals? And even if it is a Supreme
Court decision, is it a Supreme Court decision as interpreted by
Benjamin Aaron or a Supreme Court decision as interpreted by
Russell Smith? These are not fanciful objections, since potential
conflicts between contract and law will most often arise at the
periphery of established doctrine; few persons deliberately write
illegal agreements. If the parties themselves are willing to invite
the arbitrator into these borderline controversies, then naturally
he is entitled to enter. Otherwise, I submit he should defer to his
hosts and stay out.
In my opinion, the remedy for a party aggrieved by an "illegal"
award is to seek relief from the Board or to challenge the award
in court when enforcement proceedings are brought. Doesn't this
mean that the NLRB can no longer respect or "defer" to arbitra-
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tion, under its Spielberg 8 doctrine, when an unfair labor practice
allegation involves a matter that has previously been the subject
of an arbitral award? This question pinpoints what I consider an
area of fuzzy thinking in the Spielberg line of cases. Now, comity
between different tribunals always has a good bit of appeal. But
it may have prevented a critical inquiry into exactly what it is
about the arbitrator's award that the Board defers to in the subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding. Is it the award as a
whole? Is it the arbitrator's construction of an applicable statute?
Or is it merely his findings of certain facts and his interpretation
of certain contractual provisions which happen also to be essential
parts of the unfair labor practice case? I would say it is only the
last.
The Board in my view has no business abdicating its responsibility for interpreting a statute specially entrusted to its charge.
Similarly, it has no business as a public tribunal honoring a private award simply in gross, as it were. On the other hand, where
the arbitration has been fair and regular, it seems entirely proper
not to allow a party to relitigate disputed facts or disputed contract interpretations that also bear upon the issues before the
Board. In most instances this approach would not vary the results
reached under the Board's current rationale. But it would have
the healthy effect of maintaining a more understandable demarcation line between two tribunals that are in actuality entirely
different in their origin and function.
Should it make any difference to the arbitrator if the "law"
that may bear upon a particular dispute is a Supreme Court decision enunciating federal contract law under Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act rather than, say, the Veterans' Preference Act or
a Labor Board ruling under the National Labor Relations Act?
Here I'd like to call attention to a distinction drawn by Russell
Smith and Dallas Jones. If the Court's decision was merely a
determination of contractual intent, they conclude it should not
be binding on the arbitrator in a subsequent case. On the other
hand, if the Court held that a given clause carried with it certain
necessary consequences as a matter of federal substantive law,
Smith and Jones suggest that "a different result might well follow." 4 I will go along on the latter point to the extent of
a Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080, 36 LRRM 1152 (1955).

'Smith&: Jones, supra, note l, at 807.
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approving a strong presumption that the parties intended to have
their agreement interpreted as the law would ultimately require
it to be enforced. But, for me, the arbitrator in the usual case
remains just the "reader" of the instrument before him. And if,
after giving due weight to the presumption of legality, he cannot
reconcile the contract and the law, he should render the award
compelled by the contract. Nothing, I suppose, would prevent an
arbitrator from salving his conscience by including some obiter
dicta in his opinion to tell the parties how he thinks the contract
and the award will fare if they reach the courts.
Although it is beyond the compass of this panel, I'm going to
add one word on what the courts should do when asked to enforce
or to review an arbitration award allegedly at odds with some
legal mandate. Under my approach, the court accepts the arbitrator's award as the definitive exposition of the parties' agreement-absent fraud or capriciousness, of course. Having done
that, however, the court is free to enforce or reject the award on
the basis of the principles of law (other than rules of contract
interpretation) that would have been applicable had the contract
come directly to the court without the gloss of arbitration. Ordinarily, that will mean a court should set aside an award which
sustains or orders illegal conduct. I might mention, however, that
Professor Michael Sovern of Columbia argues forcefully that a
court should not consider as a defense to an award the allegation
of certain unfair labor practices, such as the enforcement of a
minority union contract. 5
I know the worst of all temptations is the itch to do good, and
I know also that the concept of jurisdiction is fast becoming an
anachronism in twentieth-century law. So I may be railing against
the tides in beseeching arbitrators to abide by the commission the
parties have entrusted to them. Nevertheless, this remains my
message: Do the job for which you are best fitted-reading and
applying contracts-and leave the statutes to the Board and the
courts. If you find no other value in my prescription, you can at
least treat it as a health measure. Who, after all, has ever heard
of an underworked member of this Academy?
5

See Sovern, "Section 301_ ~d the ~rimary Jurisdiction of the NLRB," 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 529, 561-68 (1963), citing Retail Clerks, Locals 128 and 6:J!J v. Lion Dry Goods,
Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 49 LRRM 2670 (1962). But cf. Aaron, supra, note 1, at 53.

